In the context of auctions for digital goods, an interesting random sampling auction has been proposed by . This auction has been analyzed by Feige et al. [2005] , who have shown that it obtains in expectation at least 1/15 fraction of the optimal revenue, which is substantially better than the previously proven constant bounds but still far from the conjectured lower bound of 1/4. In this article, we prove that the aforementioned random sampling auction obtains at least 1/4 fraction of the optimal revenue for a large class of instances where the number of bids above (or equal to) the optimal sale price is at least 6. We also show that this auction obtains at least 1/4.68 fraction of the optimal revenue for the small class of remaining instances, thus leaving a negligible gap between the lower and upper bound. We employ a mix of probabilistic techniques and dynamic programming to compute these bounds.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a considerable amount of work in algorithmic mechanism design. Most of this work can be divided into two categories based on their assumption about prior: (i) Bayesian, and (ii) prior free. Bayesian mechanism design is based on exploiting the knowledge of the prior to optimize the expected performance, whereas prior free mechanism design is aimed at optimizing the worst case performance. Random sampling auction is perhaps the most popular revenue maximization technique in prior free mechanism design, yet an accurate analysis of its performance has proven difficult even in the simplest applications.
This article focuses on analyzing the performance of the random sampling auction proposed by , known as the "Random Sampling Optimal Price (RSOP)" auction. The basic problem can be described as follows. A seller has unlimited supply of a good (e.g., a digital good) 1 which he is going to sell to unit demand bidders through the following auction: bids are partitioned into two sets uniformly at random; then the optimal (revenue maximizing) sale price is computed for each set, and offered as the sale price to the opposite set. The expected revenue of RSOP is then compared against the optimal revenue of selling two or more copies at a uniform price.
Most of our analysis is based on the following approach: we develop a lower bound on the performance of RSOP that depends on the level of balancedness of the partitions, but independent of the bid values; we then take the expectation of this lower bound over the varying level of balancedness to obtain a general lower bound on the performance of RSOP. This approach is in contrast to the previous work based on showing that a certain level of balancedness is met with a reasonable probability, which inevitably requires a tradeoff between how strong the balancedness condition is versus how likely it holds.
Related Work. The random sampling optimal price (RSOP) auction was proposed by , but the problems was first studied by . The revenue of RSOP has been shown to be close to optimal for many classes of interesting inputs by Segal [2003] , and Balcan et al. [2005] . There has also been a fair amount of work analyzing the performance of RSOP. Goldberg et al. [2006] showed that RSOP obtains a constant fraction of the optimal revenue, and conjectured the constant to be 1/4; note that the conjecture is tight for an instance with 2 bidders with distinct bids. A better analysis was proposed by Feige et al. [2005] which proved the constant to be at least 1/15 .
Improving the lower bound on the expected revenue of RSOP is important because RSOP is a natural and popular mechanism which is easily implementable and adaptable to various settings such as double auctions [Baliga and Vohra 2003] , online limited supply auctions [Hajiaghayi et al. 2004] , combinatorial auctions [Balcan et al. 2005; , and the money burning auction [Hartline and Roughgarden 2008] ). Indeed the results of this article have been used in analysis of other auctions such as the random sampling based auction of Devanur and Hartline [2009] for limited and online supply.
Results. The following is a summary of our main results.
(1) Improved lower bounds. We prove that the ratio of the expected revenue of RSOP to its benchmark is: -at least 1/4.68 (e.g., Theorem 3.1, and Theorem 4.1), improving the previous lower-bound of 1/15 due to Feige et al. [2005] ; -at least 1/4, if there are at least 6 bids above (or equal to) the sale price.
-at least 1/3.53, as the number of bids above (or equal to) the sale price approaches infinity. Our analysis suggests that the worst-case performance of RSOP is attained when there are only two bidders with distinct bids. (2) Upper bound. We show that there exist instances where the expected revenue of RSOP is still less than 1/2.65 of its benchmark, even when the number of bids above the optimal sale price approaches infinity. (3) Combinatorial approach. We also present a combinatorial lower bound on the performance of RSOP for a special case when each nonzero bid can take one of only two possible values.
PRELIMINARIES
We consider auctioning a digital good to n bidders whose bids are represented by the vector v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) which, without loss of generality, is sorted in decreasing order.
Definition 2.1 (RSOP).
The random sampling optimal price auction partitions the bidders into two sets A and B uniformly at random, 2 computes the optimal sale price of each set, and offers it as the sale price to the opposite set.
Definition 2.2 (OPT). The optimal revenue from single price sale to at least two bidders is
See Goldberg et al. [2006] for motivation of the definition of OPT and why it requires selling to at least two bidders.
Assumptions. Without loss of generality, we assume there are infinitely many 0 bids, that is, v j = 0 for all j > n; consequently (A, B) is a partitioning of N. The previous assumption allows us to make our analysis independent of n. Also, without loss of generality, we assume 1 ∈ B, that is, the bidder with the highest bid is in B. 3 Throughout most of our analysis we ignore the revenue of RSOP from bidders in A because in the pathological case where v 1 is too large (e.g., v 1 > OPT), the optimal sale price for B is equal to v 1 which yields no revenue when offered to A.
Notation. Throughout this article we adopt the following convention: vectors are represented by bold letters; random variables are represented by italic capital letters if single dimensional, and bold capital letters if multidimensional (such as random sets); sets are are represented by roman capital letters; and events are represented by calligraphy capital letters.
We will use E[ RSOP] to denote the expected revenue of RSOP for an implicit bid vector v, where the expectation is taken over all random partitions (A, B); however we sometimes specify an explicit bid vector by writing E[ RSOP(v)] or OPT(v).
We use λ to denote the index of the optimal sale price which sells to at least two bidders, that is,
For every j ∈ N, we define
S j , Z j , and Z are random variables which depend only on how the bids are partitioned, but not on the actual value of the bids. S j denotes how many bidders, out of the j highest bidders, are in A. Z j denotes the ratio of the revenue from B to the revenue 11:4 S. Alaei et al.
from A when v j is offered as the sale price to everyone. Z denotes the minimum of 1 and the worst case ratio of the revenue from B to the revenue from A when everyone is offered the same sale price. For every T ⊂ N and α, α ∈ [ 0, 1], we define the following events:
We omit T if T = N, that is,
Intuitively, E T α is the event that for every j ∈ T at most α fraction of the j highest bidders fall in A. Figure 1 illustrates an example of E α and E (α ,α] .
Finally, for any random variable X and any event E, we use E[ X | E] to denote the expectation of X conditioned on event E normalized by the probability of E, that is,
We will use the following proposition extensively throughout this article.
PROPOSITION 2.3. For any random variable X and any two events E, E ,
The following lemmas are used multiple times throughout the rest of this article.
LEMMA 2.4. For any T, T ⊂ N and α ∈ [ 0, 1], the two events
. PROOF. The claim follows directly from the FKG inequality [Fortuin et al. 1971] and can be found in the Appendix. LEMMA 2.5. For any α ∈ (0, 1) and j ∈ N,
where r α is the same as before.
PROOF. The claim follows from a direct application of the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound and can be found in the Appendix.
THE BASIC LOWER BOUND
In this section we prove that RSOP obtains at least 1/4 fraction of the optimal revenue for all input instances where λ > 10. In the next section, we prove a lower bound on the revenue of RSOP when λ ≤ 10 using a more sophisticated analysis based on the ideas of the current section. The following theorem summarizes the main result of this section. The outline of this section is as follows. First, we present a lower bound on E[ RSOP] as a function of λ. Recall that expectation is taken over all random partitions (A, B) for a fixed set of bids (and thus a fixed λ). Our proposed lower bound depends only on λ and not the actual value of the bids. We present a dynamic program for numerically computing the lower bound for any fixed λ. By computing the lower bound on E [ RSOP] for all λ ∈ {11 · · · 5000} we confirm that it is indeed greater than 1 4 OPT. We then prove a lower bound of 
PROOF. Let v λ A be the optimal price for A which RSOP offers to bidders in B; observe that S λ A v λ A ≥ S j v j for all j ∈ N. The revenue of RSOP is at least the revenue it obtains from B, therefore
λ Z] OPT which proves the claim. Notice that the lower bound provided by this lemma only depends on λ and does not directly depend on the exact value of the bids.
Small λ
We start by proving the first part of Theorem 3.1, that is, that E[RSOP] ≥ 1 4 OPT for all 10 < λ ≤ 5000.
Recall λ Z] over a set of small and disjoint events such that, conditioned on each such event, Z can be approximated closely by a constant. The events are defined as follows. We partition the interval [ 0, 1] to small disjoint intervals by picking m points 0.
), and therefore we can obtain a good lower bound by replacing Z with
. Notice that there is no use in picking α i from [ 0, 0.5] because for any α ∈ [ 0, 0.5], Pr[ E α ] = 0 and therefore, for any bounded random variable X, we get
Also notice that there is no use in considering the event E (α m ,1] because we can only guarantee a trivial lower bound of 0 for Z under E (α m ,1] . LEMMA 3.3. Consider any increasing sequence α 1 , . . . , α m ∈ (0.5, 1) and let α m+1 = 1. The following inequality holds for any nonnegative random variable X.
PROOF. Define α 0 = 0. We decompose E[ XZ] over the set of disjoint events
by law of total expectation,
by rearranging the terms.
Note that in the last step we have used the fact that
The choice of m and α 1 , . . . , α m in Theorem 3.3 greatly affects the value of the lower bound. Generally speaking, increasing m improves the lower bound but at the cost of more computation.
In order to use Theorem 3.3 effectively, we need to be able to compute E[ 
] − where approaches 0 exponentially fast as a function of . 
PROOF. Observe that
by Theorem 2.3,
by Theorem 2.4.
The following lemma allows us to compute an upper bound on the of the previous lemma.
LEMMA 3.5. For any α ∈ (0.5, 1] and any , ∈ N such that ≤ , the following holds:
where r α is defined in (9).
PROOF.
by Theorem 2.4,
by union bound,
by Theorem 2.5.
Observe that in the special case of this lemma in which = , the right hand side of (13) approaches 1 exponentially fast as a function of which implies that in (12) approaches 0 exponentially fast as a function of . Choosing > only improves the bound.
The next lemma provides a recurrence relation which can be used to compute the exact value of E[ 
PROOF. Let A denote the event that ∈ A. First consider ( by its definition implies S λ = k which implies the correctness of (15) for the case of = λ. Finally (16) and (17) follow trivially from the law of total probability and the law of total expectation. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1 FOR SMALL λ (I.E., 10 < λ ≤ 5000). We show how to numerically compute a lower bound on E[ RSOP] for any fixed λ. Let m = 100 and
We then compute a lower bound for each term E[
(using Theorem 3.4, Theorem 3.5, and Theorem 3.6 with = 5000 and = 100000), and substitute them in the last previous inequality to obtain a lower bound on E [ RSOP] . The computed numerical values of our lower bound are listed in I for various choices of λ. We have confirmed that E[RSOP] ≥ 1 4 OPT for all λ ∈ {11 · · · 5000}.
Large λ
We now prove the second part of λ Z]. Nevertheless, the correlation decreases as λ increases which suggests that for sufficiently large λ we can separate the two terms. In other words, when λ is large (i.e., λ > 5000), the two random variables 
because Z ≤ 1 by its definition (Equation (5)).
Recall that we can compute an upper bound on Pr[ E {λ} α ] using Theorem 2.5. Also observe that, for any fixed α ∈ (0, 0.5), Pr[ E 
We then use Theorem 3.6 to compute Pr[ E 
THE EXHAUSTIVE SEARCH LOWER-BOUND
In this section we propose an exhaustive search approach which yields an improved lower bound for RSOP for small values of λ (i.e., λ ≤ 10). The following theorem summarizes the main result of this section. Therefore, for λ = 2, E[
.55 . In fact, the lower bounds of Table I are quite close to the exact value of E[ S λ λ Z], which suggests for small values of λ we need a different approach. We now provide a high level description of the approach of this section. Without loss of generality we assume OPT = 1 which immediately implies v j ∈ [ 0, 1 j ] for all j. In addition to fixing the index of the optimal price, λ, we fix the index of the second optimal price of a higher index, λ , and also fix its corresponding revenue, OPT , that is, 
, and λ is the index of the optimal price. We compute a lower bound on the expected revenue of RSOP by computing a lower bound on RSOPMINEXPECT(λ, v, v, w , w ) for each combination of intervals and taking the minimum over all such combinations. Formally, we have RSOPMINEXPECT(λ, v, v, w , w ) . In the rest of this section we show how to compute a lower bound on the expected revenue of RSOP given the assumption that OPT ∈ [ w , w ] and
Computing a Lower Bound on
The high level idea is to enumerate all possible partitions of the first d bids, define an event for each such partition, decompose E[ RSOP] over those events, and compute a lower bound conditioned on each such event.
We start with a few definitions. For every T ⊂ [ d], we define the event
Intuitively, A T is the event that, among the highest d bidders, the subset that fall in A is exactly T. Observe that under the event A T , for every j ∈ [ d], both S j and Z j are constants; we will denote those constants respectively by
Our approach is to decompose E[ RSOP] over the set of disjoint events {A T } T⊆{2···d} and then decompose E[ RSOP | A T ] further over the set of disjoint events {E {d+1···∞} [m] for some choice of 0.5 < α 1 < · · · < α m < 1 (this decomposition is similar to Section 3). Formally, we have
.
(25)
Next we show how to compute a lower bound on
. We first define the following constants for all T ∈⊆ {2 · · · d} and α ∈ (0, 1].
Under each event (25), this definitions can be interpreted as follows. r T is a lower bound on the maximum revenue from A by offering one of the highest d bids as the sale price. A T contains all of the d highest bidders except those whose bid cannot possibly be an optimal sale price for A. ρ T α is a lower bound on the ratio of the revenue from B to the revenue from A when everyone is offered the optimal sale price of A.
LEMMA 4.2. For any d ≥ 2, any T ⊆ {2 · · · d}, and any 0.5 < α < α ≤ 1,
PROOF. Let v λ A be the optimal price for A which RSOP offers to bidders in B. Observe that
, we show that S λ A v λ A ≥ max r T , S λ λ w (i.e., a lower bound on the optimal revenue from A) and also show that Z λ A ≥ ρ T α , which combined with the given inequality imply the statement of the lemma.
-First we prove S λ
is the optimal revenue of A which must be at least r T ; furthermore, the optimal revenue of A is no less than the revenue of selling to A at price v λ which is at least
The inequality follows immediately by considering the following two possibilities:
at price v j generates a revenue which is less than r T , therefore v j cannot be the optimal price for A. (2) If λ A > d, then it must be r T ≤ αw , otherwise the revenue of selling to A at price v λ A would be less than r T which contradicts its optimality. 6 Furthermore, under event E
, we have
For any increasing sequence α 1 , . . . , α m ∈ (0.5, 1) the following inequality holds (assume α m+1 = 1).
PROOF. The claim follows by applying Theorem 4.2 to equation (25), then decom-
and applying Theorem 2.3, and then rearranging the terms.
Next we sketch the proof of the main theorem of this section.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1. We use (21) with d = 11, η = 3 and η = 100 together with Theorem 4.3 with m = 100 and α i = 0.5
To compute an accurate approximation (lower bound) on each term E[ max r T ,
we use a combination of dynamic programming and tail bounds similar to those of Theorem 3.4, Theorem 3.5, Theorem 3.6, Theorem 3.7, and Theorem 3.8 (observe that S λ is the only random variable in this term). However doing so naively requires computing a lower bound on as many as
and all α ∈ {α 1 , . . . , α m }; and then we approximate E[ max r T ,
] where c, c are the result of rounding r T and w λ down to the nearest integer multiples of 1 η respectively and a = |T| and α = α i . 8 Notice that we only need to pre-compute (η + 1) 2 dm. Table II lists the lower bound 6 The revenue of selling to 
We should also mention that we refine each configuration of intervals by cutting off infeasible regions of each interval prior to any further computation. 9 PROOF. It follows immediately from the fact that offering any of the bids as the sale price for both sets generates a total revenue that is equal to OPT. So the price that generates highest revenue for A also generates lowest revenue for B and vice versa.
AN UPPER BOUND ON PERFORMANCE OF
Theorem 5.3 suggests that, for any given λ, an equal revenue instance might actually be the worst case instance for RSOP among all instances with the same λ; however based on computer simulation that seems not to be true at least for small values of λ.
To prove Theorem 5.1, we need to show the expected revenue of RSOP is no more that 1 2.65 OPT for any equal revenue instance with distinct bids. However a direct analysis of the performance of RSOP for all such instances is not easy. Instead we define a modified variant of RSOP whose performance is easy to analyze, and whose revenue is close to the revenue of RSOP (e.g., asymptotically equal as λ → ∞).
Definition 5.4 (RSOP * ). The modified random sampling optimal price auction behaves exactly the same way as RSOP (see Theorem 2.1), except if all of the nonzero bids fall in the same set, it offers them the lowest nonzero bid as the sale price (instead of 0) .
Note that truthful reporting of bids is not a dominant strategy for the bidders in RSOP * , however it is only used in the analysis and not as an actual auction. Next we show that the revenue of RSOP is asymptotically equal to the revenue of RSOP * . PROOF. Consider an arbitrary partition (A, B) . 10 We prove the following equation
Increasing n only extends the range over which the minimum is taken which immediately implies the claim of the lemma. Next we prove the given equation.
Observe that RSOP * (q (n) ) is exactly equal to the revenue RSOP * obtains from B because no revenue is obtained from A which is offered the optimal price of B which is 1. If A ∩ {1 · · · n} = ∅, then the optimal price of A is The following is obtained by direct calculation using a computer. q (400) )] = 0.377208 ± 10 −6 .
We now prove the main theorem of this section.
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.1. To prove the theorem for any λ we exhibit a bid vector v with λ bids above the optimal sale price such that E[ RSOP(v)] < 1 2.65 OPT(v). Let n = max(λ, 400), then
by Theorem 5.6, < 0.377209 by Theorem 5.7,
Observe that the optimal sale price for q (n) is not unique. Let v be the same as q (n) everywhere except v λ = q
Observe that v λ is now the unique optimal sale price for v. It is easy to see that lim →0 E[ RSOP(v)] = E [ RSOP(q (n) )] and lim →0 OPT(v) = OPT(q (n) ) = 1, so for a small enough , we get E[ RSOP(v)] < 1 2.65 OPT(v) which completes the proof. 10 Recall that by our definition there are infinitely many zero bids so (A, B) is a partitioning of N.
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A COMBINATORIAL LOWER BOUND
In this section we present a combinatorial approach for obtaining a lower bound on the expected revenue of RSOP for equal revenue instance where each nonzero bid is either 1 or h (for some fixed h ∈ N). We hope the ideas we present in the section help develop a more general combinatorial approach in the future for proving lower bounds on mechanisms based on random sampling.
Observe that in an equal revenue instance where nonzero bids are either h or 1, if there are k bids of value h, there must be k(h − 1) bids of value 1. Throughout the rest of this section we assume h is an implicit constant. The following theorem summarizes the main result of this section. THEOREM 6.1. For any equal revenue instance where each nonzero bid is either h or 1,
where k is the number of bids of value h.
Observe that in this theorem the worst case of the lower bound is when k = 1 and h = 2 for which the lower bound becomes OPT /4. Notice that the lower bound approaches OPT /2 quickly as either k or h increases.
Definition 6.2. Q (k) denotes the multiset of bids corresponding to an equal revenue instance with k bids of value h and k(h − 1) bids of value 1.
For the rest of this section we assume that A and B are multisets containing the actual bids in each side of the partition, as opposed to the previous sections where we assumed A and B contained the indices of those bids. Furthermore, for any multiset of bids such as I, we use the notation E[ RSOP(I)], E[ RSOP * (I)] and OPT(I) to denote the respective quantity being computed on bids explicitly specified by I. We also make no assumption about which of A or B gets the highest bid, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
We start by proving a lower bound on the expected revenue of RSOP * (see Theorem 5.4) for equal revenue instances where each nonzero bid is either h or 1. We then extend the lower bound to RSOP. Recall that RSOP * behaves exactly the same way as RSOP, except if all nonzero bids fall in the same set, RSOP * offers them the lowest nonzero bid as the sale price (instead of 0). LEMMA 6.3. For any k ∈ N,
PROOF. We prove the claim by induction on k. We first prove the base case which is k = 1. The single bid of value h is the highest bid. Without loss of generality assume that the h bid is in B. Observe that the optimal price of B is h which is also the price offered to A, so no revenue is obtained from A. Furthermore the optimal price of A is 1 which is also the price offered to B. Each bid of value 1 falls in B with probability 1/2, so E[ RSOP * (Q (1) )] = 1 + h−1 2 which proves the base of the induction.
We now prove the induction step. For any two multisets of bids such as T and U, let Rev * (T, U) denote the revenue obtained from T by computing the optimal sale price for U (let the optimal price be 1 if U = ∅) and offering that price to T; also let Rev(T, p) denote the revenue obtained by offering price p to T. Let (A, B) be a random partition
The first inequality of the lemma follows immediately from Theorem A.1 by setting X j = A j , = j, p = 0.5, and ε = α − 0.5, which yields an upper bound on Pr[ E {j} α ] and thus a lower bound on Pr[ E {j} α ]. Note that A 1 = 0 with probability 1, however, that only decreases the probability on the left-hand side of (33) so it still holds.
To prove the second inequality, we proceed as follows. 
Pr
. PROOF. For every n ∈ N, define T n = T ∩ {1 · · · n}; similarly define T n , A n , B n , etc.
We start by proving Pr[ E
